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THE INSTITUTIONALIZED CHILD'S RIGHT TO
COUNSEL: SATISFYING DUE PROCESS
REQUIREMENTS THROUGH THE
PROTECTION AND ADVOCACY FOR
MENTALLY ILL INDIVIDUALS ACT
I. INTRODUCTION
Children incarcerated in institutions for the mentally ill are deprived of
their physical liberty, their friends, their family, and their community.' As
institutionalized patients, the children live in unnatural surroundings under
the continuous control of strangers and are subject to intrusive medication
or treatment.2 These conditions may violate the child's bodily integrity.3
Children in mental institutions are labeled as abnormal and sick, both while
hospitalized and after their release.4 Furthermore, institutionalized men-
tally ill children are vulnerable to abuse as well as inadequate nutrition,
clothing, education, health care, and inadequate discharge planning.5 Com-
mitment 6 to a mental hospital entails an indefinite term of confinement;
1. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 626 (1979) (Brennan, J., concurring in part, dissent-
ing in part). Justice Brennan explained why institutionalizing children is a "massive curtail-
ment of liberty." The Parham Court faced the issue of what process is constitutionally due to
a minor child whose parents or guardian seek state institutional care. The Court held that
confinement inevitably affects "fundamental rights." Id. See also Note, Civil Commitment of
the Mentally Ill, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1190, 1193-94 (1974) (stating that commitment is a
restriction on liberty).
2. Typical treatments in psychiatric institutions may include the forced administration
of psychotropic drugs, aversive conditioning, convulsive therapy, and possibly psychosurgery.
For examples of these treatments, see the cases cited in Parham, 442 U.S. at 626 nn.1-4
(Brennan, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
3. Id.
4. Id. at 626-27 (citing Note, supra, note 1, at 1200). See Note, supra note 1, at
1200-01 (stating that the stigma of mental illness can be as socially debilitating as a criminal
conviction). See also PSYCHIATRIC PATIENT RIGHTS AND PATIENT ADVOCACY 59-79 (B.
Bloom & S. Asher ed. 1982) (Vol. VII, Community Psychology Series) [hereinafter PSYCHI-
ATRIC PATIENT RIGHTS] (regarding the stigma of patienthood).
S. National Mental Health Association, Protection and Advocacy for Mentally Ill In-
dividuals Act (PL 99-319) Summary 2 (1986) [hereinafter P&A Summary]. See also Rosen-
berg & Yohalem, Litigation on Behalf of Mentally Disabled Children: Targets of Opportu-
nity (pt. 1), 10 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 70 (1986) [hereinafter Rosenberg
(pt. 1)] (patients continue to be subjected to physical harm, neglect, segregation, idleness, and
regression).
6. Note, supra note 1, at 1201 (stating that the state has power to hospitalize a per-
son). See also Donaldson v. O'Connor, 493 F.2d 507, 520 (5th Cir. 1974) (to be civilly com-
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therefore, the confinement may be both a more serious abridgment of an
individual's personal freedom and more stigmatizing than imprisonment.7
Thus, while children are confined to mental institutions, their liberty inter-
ests are "massively curtailed."' Since these liberty interests are constitu-
tionally protected, an institutionalized child is entitled to the due process
safeguards provided by the fourteenth amendment. 9
A multitude of cases, legislation, and publications have promoted the
rights of mentally ill individuals.10 Federal and state statutes,1 common
law decisions, as well as consumer organizations, 2 have influenced the
quality of care and remedies available for children confined in state-oper-
ated institutions."s However, these developments have only touched the sur-
mitted, the individual must be considered a danger to others, danger to self, or in need of
treatment, care, supervision, or custody); Ellis, Volunteering Children: Parental Commitment
of Minors to Mental Institutions, 62 CALIF. L. REV. 840, 840-52 (1974) (explaining the dif-
ferences between involuntary and voluntary commitment requirements).
7. Donaldson, 493 F.2d at 520 (confinement is indefinite, thus so is the destruction of
one's liberty). See Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 573 (1972) (stating that stigma is
a deprivation of liberty in the constitutional sense). See also infra notes 81-83 and accompany-
ing text.
8. Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107, 113 (1966) (confinement to a mental institution
involves a massive curtailment of liberty affecting a fundamental right); In re Gault, 387 U.S.
1, 27 (1967) (explaining why institutionalization restrains one's liberty). See also Note, supra
note 1, at 1201 (commitment involves state power that may deprive an individual of his
liberty).
9. "[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law .... U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. See Vitek v. Jones, 45 U.S. 480 (1980);
Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504, 509 (1972) (stating that hospitalization is a curtailment of
freedom and thus a liberty interest is affected; therefore, due process is required). See also
Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 600 (1979) ("It is not disputed that a child, in common with
adults, has a substantial liberty interest in not being confined unnecessarily for medical treat-
ment and that the state's involvement in the commitment decision constitutes state action
under the Fourteenth Amendment."); Romeo v. Youngberg, 644 F.2d 147, 157 (3d Cir. 1980)
(stating that involuntary commitment is a massive curtailment of liberty and is circumscribed
by due process protections).
10. PSYCHIATRIC PATIENT RIGHTS, supra note 4, at 15 (stating that the amount of
litigation, statutes, and regulations of psychiatric patients' rights has dramatically increased
over the past fifteen years). See also id. at 37-47 (a discussion of mentally ill adult patients'
rights); Morris, Institutionalizing the Rights of Mental Patients: Committing the Legislature,
62 CALIF. L. REv. 957 (1974) (overview of mental patients' rights).
11. See, e.g., notes 17, 143 & 185 and accompanying text.
12. For example, National Mental Health Association (NMHA) and the National Al-
liance for the Mentally Ill.
13. Rosenberg (pt. 1), supra note 5, at 70. See infra notes 17, 20-23 & 185 for various
acts. See also Romeo v. Youngberg, 644 F.2d 147 (3d Cir. 1980) (the court gave children in
institutions the right to adequate treatment and protection based on the fourteenth amend-
ment); Stroul, Child and Adolescent Service System Program (CASSP), System Change
Strategies; A Workbook for States 1 (1985) (CASSP is an organization under the National
Institute of Mental Health [hereinafter NIMH] that addresses the needs of seriously emotion-
ally disturbed [hereinafter SED] children).
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face of the many problems associated with committing children to mental
institutions. Even with these added safeguards, the due process rights of
institutionalized children remain inadequately protected because they have
no one to effectively represent their interests.1"
The current mental health system has left mentally ill children legally
isolated and the "most underrepresented of individuals."1 5 Institutionalized
children are extremely susceptible to hard~hip, neglect, and violation of
their rights;10 yet they have little or no redress under current statutes or
common law.17 The best way to ensure that institutionalized children's in-
14. Rosenberg (pt. 1), supra note 5. See Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979) (the
Supreme Court has not required states to provide similar due process safeguards to institution-
alized children even in commitment proceedings).
15. Rosenberg (pt. 1), supra note 5, at 70.
16. National Mental Health Association Position Paper, Mental Health Care for Chil-
dren and Youth 1 (1987) [hereinafter Position Paper] (stating that over 70% of mentally ill
children do not receive the necessary and appropriate services to effectively treat their ill-
nesses); Isaacs, Technical Assistance Package for the Child and Adolescent Services System
Program 7 (1984) (stating that youth, especially SED children, are a grossly underserved pop-
ulation and that few children with serious mental health problems receive adequate, compre-
hensive care for these problems). Most mentally ill children receive services in an uncoordi-
nated or inappropriate manner, if at all. Id. at 9. See also supra note 5 and infra notes 171 &
198 and accompanying text.
17. The existence of a private right of action and the scope of the remedy are ex-
tremely limited. Rosenberg (pt. 1), supra note 5, at 70. "The Supreme Court has placed for-
midable procedural and substantive obstacles before litigants restricting their access to the
courts and the scope of relief that may be granted," thereby making statutes difficult to en-
force and limiting the scope of relief. Id. Rosenberg states that if there is a private remedy, the
action must be against an institution that takes funds under The Developmental Disabities
Assistance and Bill of Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6001-81 (1982 & Supp. 111984) (DDA Act).
Id. at 71.
The DDA Act has led to protective councils in each state, which are mandated to develop
comprehensive statewide plans for handicapped persons. Id. Also, the article states that there
is a strong suggestion that only programs receiving DDA Act funds can be sued; therefore,
remedies under this Act are severely limited because few institutions receive funding. Id. In
order for the Bill of Rights to apply to children, a parent or guardian must pursue the rights
and, as this note discusses, this step is rarely taken. See infra text accompanying notes 113-14,
204, 215. Further, these DDA Act rights are expressed as a "Sense of Congress," which means
they are not binding on the states. P&A Summary, supra note 5, at 6.
The Medicaid Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1396d (c), (d) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986), may also be
applied to the mentally ill in some circumstances. Rosenberg (pt. 1), supra note 5, at 71.
Although private actions are not explicitly authorized by statute, there may be some judicial
support allowing a mentally ill individual to bring a suit. See Smith v. Heckler, 747 F.2d 583
(10th Cir. 1984) (class action by Medicaid recipients against the Department of Health and
Human Services for not informing residents of their Medicaid entitlements). Strict enforce-
ment of the Medicaid Act could improve the quality of care in institutions. Currently, these
Medicaid regulations are ineffective in the protection of institutionalized children, because
they do not apply to psychiatric institutions. Rosenberg (pt. 1), supra note 5, at 71.
Quality assurance in psychiatric institutions is the responsibility of the Joint Commission
on the Accreditation of Hospitals (JCAH). Id. However, the JCAH has done an inadequate
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terests are protected and to satisfy the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment is by recognizing an institutionalized child's right to counsel . 8
Advocacy for institutionalized mentally ill children, unfortunately, is
virtually nonexistent despite many years of institutional reform.' 9 However,
other past underrepresented classes, such as the poor, handicapped, elderly,
and neglected children, are offered advocacy services through Medicaid, 20
the Education for All Handicapped Children Act (Handicapped Children
Act),2 the Rehabilitation Act,22 the Long Term Ombudsmen program for
the elderly, 3 representation for abused and neglected children,2 4 and the
Legal Services Corporation (civil assistance to the poor) 5 Unfortunately
none of these programs are specifically geared toward advocating the rights
and needs of institutionalized children,28 which is striking given the United
States' commitment to the needs of children. 27 Thus, children's rights are
often overlooked due to of the absence of advocacy programs for institution-
job. "Its reviews and enforcement of correction plans are extremely lax," and there is a conflict
of interest in cutting off any funds when violations are found. Id.
Also, few tort actions are brought due to lack of counsel, because families often cannot
afford to hire an attorney. Id. at 71-72. However, a damage action can be successful and may
provide an impetus to systematic change. Id. See also infra notes 202-04 and accompanying
text.
18. When an individual is deprived of liberty, the state must provide adequate due
process. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I. For the statute's full text, see supra note 9.
19. J. PAUL, G. NEUFELD & J. PELOSI, CHILD ADVOCACY WITHIN THE SYSTEM 95
(1977) [hereinafter CHILD ADVOCACY]. "It is remarkable that such a necessary and effective
monitoring device has never been included in the desire to bring decency to the lives of those
institutionalized." Id.
20. 42 U.S.C. § 1396d (c), (d) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). See supra note 17.
21. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-61 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
22. 29 U.S.C. § 754 (1982). The Rehabilitation Act has played an important role in
litigation involving young children and young adults. Rosenberg (pt. 2), infra note 223, at 146.
Strict enforcement of this Act could improve the quality of care in institutions and be a valua-
ble vehicle to protect individual rights, by allowing a private right of action, if discrimination
of the handicapped can be shown (the care received is below community standards). Rosen-
berg (pt. 1), supra note 5, at 71.
23. Older Americans Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3021-30d (Supp. IV 1986); Scallet, Protection
& Advocacy Systems For People Receiving Mental Health Services 3, 10-11 (1986) (available
from the NIMH, Rockville, Maryland) (explaining that Title III of the Older Americans Act
establishes an ombudsman program to investigate and work on residents' complaints and to
monitor their care).
24. For a summary of state statutes requiring legal representation for maltreated chil-
dren, see Butz, Lawyering for the Abused Child: "You Can't Go Home Again," 29 UCLA L.
REV. 1216, 1245-48. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.630 (West Supp. 1988); VA.
CODE ANN. § 16.1-266 (1988).
25. Scallet, supra note 23, at 10-11. These programs have also overlooked protection
for mentally ill children in psychiatric hospitals. Telephone interview with Natalie Reatig,
coordinator of the Protection and Advocacy Program at the NIMH (Mar. 3, 1988).
26. See supra note 17.
27. CHILD ADVOCACY, supra note 19, at 95.
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alized children. The absence of such programs can largely be attributed to
the states' financial concern 28 and the states' hesitancy to usurp parental
rights.29
The unconstitutionality of inadequate representation and violation of
due process rights during the child's confinement to a mental institution
must be addressed. The solution is to provide an efficient and effective
method for implementing the child's right to counsel that takes into consid-
eration parental rights and financial priorities. This note proposes that ad-
vocacy programs for institutionalized children should be implemented
through the most recent institutional reform act, the Protection and Advo-
cacy for Mentally Ill Individuals Act of 1986 (P&A Act).30 However, to
more effectively provide services to children, the P&A Act should have an
amendment explicitly including children, with proposed guidelines for the
state protection and advocacy (P&A) program geared toward institutional-
ized children. For example, under the proposed guidelines, advocates of a
child's rights would be able to: work with the hospital staff and the parents
to ensure institutionalized children receive quality treatment and care,
bring actions against doctors and hospitals, and represent children before
review boards, all without usurping parental rights. Thus, through the pro-
posed P&A program, the advocate would provide the protection required to
satisfy due process requirements.
This note begins by discussing the implications of the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment as applied to institutionalized children.
Next, this note seeks to establish an institutionalized child's right to counsel
by analyzing the various interests involved throughout the child's hospitali-
zation. Then, the private interests of the parents and the children, the gov-
ernment's interests, and the risks associated with the present system are
weighed against the presumption that denies children the right to counsel.
Third, this note suggests that an institutionalized child's right to counsel
can best be implemented through advocacy programs offered under the
P&A Act, to which this note proposes an amendment that explicitly in-
cludes children and contains guidelines for its application. This note also
presents an example of how the P&A program could be implemented to
ensure proper education for institutionalized children. Finally, this note ex-
amines the problems associated with the expansion of the P&A Act and
solutions that will mitigate these potential problems.
28. See infra note 106, 206, 222 and accompanying text.
29. See infra notes 96-101, 105, 208-09 and accompanying text.
30. 42 U.S.C. §§ 10801-51 (Supp. IV 1986). This Act has recently been changed as
amended in Pub. L. No. 100-509, Oct. 20, 1988; however, these changes do not effect the
discussion in this note.
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II. PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS AS REQUIRED UNDER THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT
Procedural due process is a constitutional guarantee of fair procedure
when "state action" 3' 1 deprives an individual of life, liberty, or property.32
Therefore, confinement to a mental institution through involuntary commit-
ment by a court, or voluntary commitment to a public hospital by a parent
over a child's objection, requires procedural due process.33 Procedural due
process protects the child's liberty interests and substantive rights. These
rights include the right to reasonably safe conditions of confinement and the
right to freedom from unnecessary bodily restraint. 4
The courts determine what process is due to protect an individual's
liberty interest by considering the three factors set out in Mathews v. El-
dridge:5 1) the private interest that will be affected by the official action,
2) the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the proce-
dures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional procedural safe-
guards, and 3) the government's interest, including the fiscal and adminis-
trative burdens that the additional or substitute procedures would entail.
From the patients' perspective, a court must assess two of these factors: the
importance of the liberty interest at stake and the extent to which the sug-
gested procedure may reduce erroneous decision-making.36 These factors
must then be weighed against the remaining factor: the government's inter-
est in avoiding the increased administrative and fiscal burdens imposed by
the additional procedural requirements.3 '
The Supreme Court has imposed a presumption against the right to
counsel when the increased procedure consists of the right to counsel. This
presumption against the right to counsel can only be overcome by meeting
the requirements of the Mathews balancing test, unless the individual will
be deprived of his physical liberty by the present procedures, in which case
the right to counsel should be freely recognized by the courts.38 The three
31. J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 498 (2d ed. 1983)
[hereinafter CONSTITUTIONAL LAW] (stating that state action exists if the court finds the al-
leged conduct to have sufficient connections to the government).
32. Id. at 534.
33. Id. at 535 (however, the courts have not clearly defined the procedures required).
34. See id. at 536.
35. 424 U.S. 319, 321 (1976). These factors were applied to the confinement of chil-
dren to mental hospitals. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 599-608 (1979).
36. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 31, at 560.
37. Id.
38. Lassiter v. Department of Social Services, 452 U.S. 18 (1981). The Supreme Court
considered whether indigent parents have a due process right to counsel in parental termina-
tion hearings and held that counsel is not required for every status termination proceeding. Id.
at 24-32. The Court reviewed prior right to appointed counsel cases and determined that a
presumption against the right to counsel existed. Id. at 25-27.
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elements of the balancing test are then weighed and balanced against the
presumption denying the right to appointed counsel. 9 If a right to counsel
is granted, the courts look to whether appointed counsel will add to the
fairness of the proceedings and advance a government interest.4 0 Thus,
judges make case-by-case determinations41 as to whether the failure to ap-
point counsel for an institutionalized child would be so fundamentally un-
fair as to violate due process.42
Courts have already extended a right to counsel to delinquent
juveniles43 and to adult mental patients44 in order to protect their liberty
interests through adequate procedural due process. However, this same pro-
tection is not presently given to institutionalized mentally ill children.4 5 In
order to promote fairness through the application of procedural due process,
courts should also extend a right to counsel to institutionalized mentally ill
children.
III. ARGUMENTS FOR AN INSTITUTIONALIZED CHILD'S RIGHT TO
COUNSEL: SATISFYING DUE PROCESS REQUIREMENTS
The institutionalized child should be afforded the same constitutional
rights that every citizen in the United States is granted. American citizens
have a number of personal rights that are inherent in our judicial system.
First, citizens have the right to be protected from the choices or actions of
another. This includes both the right not to be physically restrained in an
institution without due process of law and the right not to have one's prop-
erty taken without just compensation.46 This right does not require a certain
level of competence or intelligence; thus, the denial of these rights to chil-
dren cannot be justified.47 In fact, rights that are intended to protect indi-
viduals from unfair action should be strengthened when the individual is
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Lassiter cites with approval Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 788 (1973), which
states that each case is decided individually to determine whether probationer or parolee
should be represented by counsel to satisfy due process. Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 26.
42. Id.
43. In re i6ault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967). For a further discussion of In re Gault, see infra
notes 53-60 and accompanying text.
44. Coe v. Hughes, No. K-83-4248 (D. Md. filed Dec. 12, 1983) (order granting con-
sent decree). For a further discussion of Coe, see infra notes 84-94 and accompanying text.
45. See Ellis, supra note 6; Kleinfeld, infra note 62.
46. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (As to property, the fifth amendment is applied to the
states through the fourteenth amendment.). For the pertinent text of this amendment, see
supra note 9.
47. Kleinfeld, infra note 62, at 322 (arguing that even animals are given rights, "no
matter how unintelligent or imprudent" they may be).
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young and less competent. 8 Second, individuals have a right to counsel in
civil cases, if required to satisfy the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment, 49 and in criminal proceedings to satisfy the sixth amendment. 50
For over twenty-five years, courts have extended personal rights
through the due process protection of minors in juvenile delinquency pro-
ceedings 51 and the due process protection of prospective mental patients in
initial commitment proceedings. 52 Even though the representation of chil-
dren has historically not been a common function of attorneys in the United
States' legal system,53 the Supreme Court in In Re Gault54 extended a right
to counsel to all juveniles in delinquency proceedings.5 5 The Court stated
that neither the fourteenth amendment nor the Bill of Rights5 is limited to
adults only, and, therefore, juvenile delinquency hearings must meet the
essentials of due process and fair treatment.57 The Court did not discern
any material difference between an adult's right to, and need for, counsel
48. Id.
49. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. For the pertinent text of the amendment, see supra note
9. See also Lassiter v. Department of Social Services, 452 U.S. 18 (1981) (civil case determin-
ing if a right to counsel is required).
50. U.S. CONsT. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right to. . . have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence."). The Court in Gideon v. Wain-
wright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), held that lawyers for indigent criminals are not a luxury but a
necessity, because of the inability of defendants to competently defend themselves. Id. There-
fore, a criminal defendant has a fundamental right to counsel, and the denial of this right
violates due process. Id. The right to counsel is given to delinquent youth under Kent v. United
States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966). In Kent, the Court held that delinquency proceedings require
procedures that satisfy due process. Id. at 561-62. However, the delinquency hearing does not
have to conform with all the requirements of a criminal trial or an administrative hearing. Id.
For a general history of the juvenile court system and its policies, see In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1,
14-19 (1967).
51. The Supreme Court, 1978 Term, 93 HARV. L. REV. 62, 89 & n.1 (1979) (see cases
cited); Kent, 383 U.S. at 561-62; Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 263 (1984) (certain constitu-
tional protections enjoyed by adults are also applicable to juveniles).
52. The Supreme Court, 1978 Term, supra note 51, at 89 n.2 (see cases cited).
53. In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 14. "In practically all jurisdictions, there are rights
granted to adults which are withheld from juveniles." Id. For the rationale behind the differ-
ences between adult and juvenile rights, see id. at 17.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 26, 41. However, the Court was concerned that counsel would lead to an
adversarial climate in juvenile proceedings and hinder the therapeutic environment. Id. at 15-
16.
56. U.S. CoNsT. amend. I-X.
57. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 30-31 (1967) (however, the hearing need not measure up
to the requirements of a criminal trial or administrative hearing). But see id. at 61 (Justice
Black concurred and dissented in part stating that the right to counsel is unequivocally granted
by provisions of the fifth and sixth amendments, which are applicable to states under the
fourteenth amendment.). "[I]t would be a plain denial of equal protection of the laws-an
invidious discrimination-to hold that . . . children be denied the same constitutional safe-
guards" as adults are afforded. Id.
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and a juvenile's right to and need for counsel.58 Thus, the Court stated that
it would not be sufficient for either a court or a probation officer to re-
present a child's interest when a parent fails to represent the child. 59 The
Court further held that in order to meet the requirements of procedural due
process in a delinquency proceeding, a court must notify the parents that
the child has a right to counsel and appoint counsel when the parents are
unable to afford representation.60
The due process requirements set forth in Gault should apply to insti-
tutionalized children, not only during the initial commitment proceedings
but also throughout their confinement. Institutionalized children, like the
juveniles in Gault, are subject to continuous state action that deprives them
of their liberty. 1 However, few children in psychiatric institutions have ac-
cess to effective counsel who can advocate and protect their rights, interests,
and needs.62 This absence of effective counsel is partly attributed to a
child's inability to hire an attorney. Further, even if the parents are able
and willing to hire an attorney, children have few rights for the attorney to
enforce.63 Some of these "rights" may include the right to: sufficiently qual-
ified mental health professionals, teachers, and staff, who have specialized
skills in the care and treatment of children and young adults; recreation
and play opportunities conducted outside and with proper facilities; ar-
rangements for contact between the hospital and the child's family; ade-
quate psychological treatment; and opportunities for publicly supported ed-
58. Id. at 36. "A child charged with delinquency requires a guiding hand of counsel at
every step of the proceedings." Id. (citing Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69 (1932)).
59. Id.
60. Id. at 38-41. See also N.Y. JUD. LAW § 241 (McKinney 1983). This section of the
Family Court Act states that minors have a right to the assistance of counsel of their own
choosing or a legal guardian in a neglect proceeding under article III of the Act. The Act is
based on a finding that counsel is often indispensable to a practical realization of due process
of law and may be helpful in making reasoned determinations of fact and proper orders of
disposition. In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 40. (footnotes omitted). See id. at 38 n.63 for more Acts
regarding counsel for children. Also, in Romeo v. Youngberg, 644 F.2d 147 (3d Cir. 1980),
the court stated that it was the duty of the court to safeguard the constitutional rights of those
confined. Id. at 157 (advocacy services, however, would not depend on parents asking for
counsel).
61. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 599-600 (1979). For a discussion of state action, see
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 31, at 536 & n.17.
62. Kleinfeld, The Balance of Power Among Infants, Their Parents, and the State, 4
FAM. L.Q. 320, 340-41 (1970) (stating that children have not been given adequate representa-
tion). A major reason for poor representation of child patients in commitment proceedings is
the heavy caseload of public defenders and appointed counsel in many jurisdictions. Other
than civil commitment hearings, representation is nearly "obsolete." Ellis, supra note 6, at
882. The reason behind the lack of representation probably is more closely related to finances
than legal doctrine. Since children lack funds, they are not able to hire counsel, and without
representation, children, being minors, do not have standing. Id. at 886.
63. Id.
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ucation that is tailored to the child's mental condition."' Although states
have enacted statutes promoting children's rights,6 5 the enforcement of
these rights depends on a child's right to counsel. 6
To establish a child's right to counsel, courts must engage in a balanc-
ing test. First, the Court must balance and analyze the factors set out in
Mathews v. Eldridge and then weigh them against the presumption that
denies a child's right to counsel. 67 An exception to this presumption against
the right to counsel exists if the child's liberty interest is continually
threatened. 68 However, even disregarding the fact that the child's confine-
ment may satisfy the exception, the presumption can be outweighed by the
three factors established by the Supreme Court in Mathews.6 9 As previ-
ously indicated, the three factors the courts must analyze are the private
interests involved, the government's interests, and the risks associated with
the present system compared to the value of the proposed procedures.70 An
analysis of these factors will determine if the institutionalized mentally ill
child receives the due process guarantees established in the Constitution. If
the court determines that the state is not providing the institutionalized
child with adequate due process as required by the fourteenth amendment,
the presumption against the right to counsel will be outweighed.71 Assum-
ing the presumption against the right to counsel exists, that is, the child's
64. These rights were included in Alabama's special provisions for children in reaction
to Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 373, 385 (M.D. Ala. 1972), affid sub nom., Wyatt v.
Aderhold, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974) (a class action brought for proper treatment stan-
dards). The Wyatt court recognized the deprivation of a patient's constitutional right to "a
realistic opportunity to be cured and to improve his or her mental condition." Wyatt, 344 F.
Supp. at 374. The court appointed human rights committees to oversee the implementation of
the court ordered minimum constitutional standards. Id. at 376. The committees are to oversee
and assist patients who believe their rights have been infringed upon. Id. Wyatt was an exami-
nation of the plight of patients and serves as a vehicle for reform.
65. See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 43-1-18 (1978). "A minor . . . in a residential facil-
ity. . . shall be provided such education. . . as necessary. . . . In no event shall a minor be
allowed to remain in a residential facility for more than thirty days without receiving educa-
tional services." Id.
66. Ellis, supra note 6, at 886. For a historic summary and recent developments, see
PSYCHIATRIC PATIENT RIGHTS, supra note 4, at 32.
67. Lassiter v. Department of Social Services, 452 U.S. 18 (1981) (see supra note 38
for further discussion of the presumption). For an example of a right to counsel, see Vitek v.
Jones, 445 U.S. 480 (1980) (indigent prisoner is entitled to appointed counsel before being
transferred to a mental hospital).
68. For arguments that a child's physical liberty is threatened, see supra notes 1-9 and
accompanying text.
69. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). See also Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 25-27
(the presumption against counsel can be overcome by a strong private interest, weak state
interests, and a peaked risk of error). For a discussion of these elements, see text accompany-
ing notes 73-137.
70. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335; Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 27.
71. Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 27.
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physical liberty is not threatened by the current procedures, the Mathews
factors involved in an institutionalized child's right to counsel case must be
explored in order to establish an institutionalized child's right to counsel.
A. An Analysis of the Private Interests Involved
The first factor in determining what process is due to institutionalized
children is to decide what private interests are at stake in the current
mental health system. The child has several private interests at risk while
he or she remains in a mental institution. First, the child has a substantial
liberty interest in not being confined unnecessarily for medical treatment.2
The child should have "the freedom to go in and out of the door, to run and
play, . . . to go to school, . . to go to Sunday school and church, . . . to
watch and listen or not watch and listen to television.173 Second, a child has
an interest in not suffering from the adverse social consequences related to
institutionalization, such as stigmatization.74
In Parham v. J.R., the Supreme Court focused on stigmatization as
the private interest at stake, but the Court argued that the problems relat-
ing to the social stigmatization of the institutionalized child were minimal
compared to the proper diagnosis and treatment that institutionalization
can provide.7 5 The Court felt that the adverse social reactions to institution-
alizing a child should not be equated with the state labeling the child as a
delinquent or as mentally ill, because the state's child commitment proce-
dures are generally voluntary.78 Furthermore, the Court stated that even an
untreated mentally ill child is subjected to at least as much negative stigma
and ostracism as a child receiving treatment in a psychiatric hospital."7
Since the Court focused on the issue of stigmatization as a private interest
at stake, the Court failed to adequately consider the many other interests of
an institutionalized child. Specifically, the Court did not address the issue
of whether these interests continue after the initial commitment, regardless
of the voluntary commitment and diagnosis.
72. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 600 (1979).
73. J.L. v. Parham, 412 F. Supp. 112, 136 (M.D. Ga. 1976) (lower court opinion).
74. Parham, 442 U.S. at 600. The Parham Court recognized that civil commitment
produces adverse effects because of the reaction of society to the discovery that the child re-
ceived psychiatric care. But cf. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425-26 (1979) (stating that
the societal reaction would be more severe for a child who is not institutionalized and contin-
ues living in the outside world); W. Schmidt, Jr., Considerations of Social Science in a Recon-
sideration of Parham v. J.R. and the Commitment of Children to Public Mental Institutions,
J. OF PSYCHIATRY & L. 339, 341-45 (Fall/Winter 1985) (discussing the inadequate founda-
tion and sources relied on by the Parham court).
75. Parham, 442 U.S. at 600-01.
76. Id. at 600-01.
77. Id. at 601.
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Even when a person is incarcerated or confined following fair adminis-
trative or judicial procedures, his liberty interests are not completely termi-
nated.718 Juveniles, whether mentally ill or not, have an interest in freedom
from institutional restraint. This liberty interest of the juvenile, like an
adult, is substantial even if the incarceration of the juvenile is only brief.7"
As previously noted in the Gault decision, the Supreme Court has recog-
nized that counsel is needed for minors facing criminal detention in juvenile
proceedings. Likewise, the Court should recognize that mentally ill
juveniles who face an indefinite term of detention also need counsel."
Juvenile mental patients may have an even greater need for an attor-
ney's assistance than juvenile delinquents. First, mental patients are gener-
ally subject to "even more far-reaching interference" with their rights than
those convicted of crimes,8' due to the negative effects associated with stig-
matization, medication, and poor hospital review procedures.82 More impor-
tantly, mental patients are generally less likely than criminals to fully un-
derstand the nature and consequences of the proceedings affecting their
rights or to represent their own interests while institutionalized.8 There-
fore, the institutionalized child also needs counsel, not only because he has
the same private liberty interests at stake as a juvenile delinquent, but also
because of the mentally ill child's diminished capacity to understand his
rights.
Institutionalized children should have at least the minimum level of
advocacy services that are offered to adult mental patients. Adult mental
patients' rights were recognized by the Maryland District Court in Coe v.
78. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 31, at 536-39. Even those individuals who are
on probation or parole retain their liberty interests. Id. at 536. See also sources cited supra
note 1 (regarding liberty interests).
79. Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 265 (1984). However, the Court qualifies this by
stating that juveniles are always in some form of custody. Id.
80. The In re Gault Court stated that counsel is needed for juveniles to cope with
problems of law, to make a skilled inquiry into the facts, to insist upon regularity of proceed-
ings, to ascertain defenses, and to prepare and submit the case. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 36
(1967) (all of these needs, along with a myriad of others, such as monitoring treatment and
educational rights, also are essential for the mentally ill child). Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584,
631 (1979) (Brennan, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) ("A child who has been ousted
from his family has even a greater need for an independent advocate."). See also The Su-
preme Court, 1978 Term, supra note 51, at 89, 94.
81. KITTRIE, THE RIGHT TO BE DIFFERENT: DEVIANCE AND ENFORCED THERAPY 91
(1971). Criminals are guaranteed counsel before they are tried and convicted; however, the
mentally ill are not afforded the same protection, even though both are subject to a curtail-
ment of their liberty interests.
82. See supra notes 1-7 and accompanying text.
83. Ellis, supra note 6, at 882 (quoting Professor Kittrie). See also Note, supra note 1,
at 1284 (stating that the mentally ill have less ability to protect their own interests because of
"ignorance, feeble mindedness, [or] illiteracy .... ).
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Hughes.84 The decision explained the proposition that institutionalized
mental patients have private interests at stake that require legal assistance.
In Coe, the plaintiffs sought to establish a constitutional right of access to
the courts for the patients of Maryland's psychiatric hospitals. 5 The case
was brought in response to a United States Supreme Court case that placed
affirmative obligations on states to assure prison inmates adequate, effec-
tive, and meaningful access to their courts." The Coe plaintiffs demanded
comparable legal resources for mental patients because of the patients' in-
ability to use the various self-help techniques, which the Supreme Court
had offered to prison inmates.8
7
The court in Coe entered a consent decree after the defendants volun-
tarily decided they would implement a legal assistance program and a resi-
dent grievance system in inpatient mental facilities.8 This program, known
as the Legal Assistance Program,8 9 does not assist patients during civil
commitment proceedings, since the public defender already provides for
such services.90 Instead, the Legal Assistance Program represents adult
mental patients throughout detainment in regard to their civil rights, enti-
tlements to government benefits, and other basic legal problems that inter-
fere with effective treatment.9 1 All of the services that the court found im-
portant for adults would also benefit institutionalized mentally ill children.9 2
Thus, a program similar to the Legal Assistance Program should be offered
to institutionalized children.
Institutionalized children have more compelling reasons for a right to
counsel than do adult mental patients. Mentally ill children are often con-
fined for longer periods than adults.93 Furthermore, childhood is a particu-
larly vulnerable time of life, and children erroneously institutionalized dur-
ing their "formative years may bear the scars for the rest of their lives."9
84. No. K-83-4248 (D. Md. filed Dec. 12, 1983).
85. Id.
86. See Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1977) (decision required prison authorities to
assist inmates in preparing and filing legal papers by providing law libraries or persons trained
in the law).
87. Id.
88. Coe, No. K-83-4248, at 8 (order granting consent decree) ($500,000 a year granted
to offer full range of services to 2,800 inpatients).
89. Id. at 2, 5.
90. Rosenberg (pt. 1), supra note 5, at 72 & n.13.
91. Coe, No. K-83-4248, at 2 (rights advisors and independent attorneys will help en-
force claims to benefits, entitlements, and basic civil legal problems). See also Rosenberg (pt.
1), supra note 5, at 72 (ensuring adequate institutional conditions and rights).
92. Coe, No. K-83-4248, at 4 (the definition of "resident" does not specifically include
institutionalized children, but children should fit within the definition).
93. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 628 (1979) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
94. Id. See also supra note 74, infra note 134 and accompanying text; Eddings v.
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Despite these problems, the courts have not granted institutionalized chil-
dren equivalent court access, largely due to the fear of usurping parental
authority and financial concerns.95
In Parham v. J.R., the Supreme Court stated that the evaluation of
the child's interest is "inextricably linked with the parents' interest in and
obligation for the welfare and health of the child."96 Therefore, the child's
private interest must be combined with the parents' concerns and rights.97
In considering the parents' interests, the Court adopted the historical ap-
proach of giving broad parental authority over children. 8 The Court left
"life's difficult decisions" to the parents because it is recognized that par-
ents generally act in the child's best interest.99 Thus, the Court felt that
government involvement in the parents' decision is repugnant to American
tradition and should only be used in extreme cases of abuse and neglect."' 0
The Court concluded that a presumption exists that a parent acts in the
child's best interest. 10 '
However, when the courts give total discretion to the parents with a
presumption of good faith, the courts ignore the problem that if the child
does not have an alternate form of representation, rarely will the parents'
neglect of the child's best interest be recognized. Even though parents
should act in the child's best interest, this is not always the case. 02 In fact,
the Supreme Court and other observers have recently questioned the pre-
sumed benevolence of the family.'0 3 Unfortunately, parents and hospitals
may have a conflict of interest with the child, or the parents may be una-
ware of the existing safeguards for children in institutions; therefore, the
Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115 (1982) (minority "is a time and condition of life when a person
may be more susceptible to influence and psychological damage").
95. See infra notes 205-32 and accompanying text regarding interference in the parent-
child relationship and financial concerns.
96. Parham, 442 U.S. at 600.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 602.
99. Id. (citing to 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *447; 2 J. KENT, COMMENTARIES
ON AMERICAN LAW *190 (stating that "natural bonds of affection lead parents to act in the
best interests of their children")).
100. Id. at 602-03 (see cases cited as to when courts intervene).
101. Id. at 604. But cf. id. at 626 (Brennan's concurrence and dissent states that this
presumption is inaccurate.).
102. The Supreme Court, 1978 Term, supra note 51, at 92 & n.28. See id. at 93-94
(explaining why the parent-child relationship regarding institutionalization is distinguishable
from the ordinary parental role). Also, the Parham Court's confidence in the medical diagno-
sis, treatment, and psychiatric decisions is questioned in the article. Id.
103. Id. at n.28 (citing Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 75 (1976));
O'Connor v. Liberty, 442 U.S. 563, 580 (1975) (Burger, C.J., concurring); T. SzAsz, LAW,
LIBERTY, AND PSYCHIATRY (1963); Albers, Pasewark & Meyer, Involuntary Hospitalization
and Psychiatric Testimony: The Fallibility of the Doctrine of Immaculate Perception, 6 CAP.
U.L. REv. 11 (1976); Ellis, supra note 6, at 849, 851-52.
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parents are unable to adequately promote the child's best interests.'"
B. The Government Interests Involved
The second factor that must be considered in determining what process
is due to institutionalized children is the government's interest in the pre-
sent mental health system and the additional burdens that providing coun-
sel (an advocate) would create. First, the government has an interest in
protecting the parents' decision-making rights in the areas of childrear-
ing.105 Second, the government has an interest in medical decisions regard-
ing children to ensure that the hospital is providing adequate care and is
limiting confinement to those children in genuine need of this type of treat-
ment, so as to not waste funds nor a psychiatrist's time in unnecessary
treatment and testifying in adversary hearings.' Third, the state has a
significant interest in not imposing unnecessary procedural obstacles that
may discourage the child or his family from seeking any needed psychiatric
assistance.10 7
In Parham v. J.R., the Court felt that many parents would forego care
for their child if they had to participate in adversary proceedings that ques-
tioned their motives and looked into private family matters.108 However, the
Court's concern was whether parental admission of the child to a psychiat-
ric hospital met procedural due process standards. Additionally, the Court
did not analyze the continuing liberty interests and the due process rights of
children throughout their confinement in a mental institution. Since the
Court did not analyze either the institutionalized child's right to counsel
while being detained in a mental institution nor how the proposed P&A
services could be utilized in light of due process concerns, the risks of the
present system and the value of the proposed amendment and guidelines
require discussion and analysis.
104. See infra notes 107, 116-17, & 120 and accompanying text.
105. See, e.g., Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979) (stating that the child's inter-
ests are clearly subordinate to the parents, even when a child's liberty or safety is threatened);
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (where parent's rights outweighed the state's com-
pulsory education laws); Tinker v. Des Moines Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (courts limit
the state in displacing parental authority over children).
106. Parham, 442 U.S. at 604-06; Graves v. AFSD, 708 P.2d 1180, 1186 (1985) (stat-
ing the government's interest in giving the least costly care and keeping financial and adminis-
trative burdens to a minimum).
107. Parham, 442 U.S. at 605.
108. Id.
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C. An Analysis of the Risks of the Present System and the Value of the
Substituted Procedures
1. The Risks of the Present System
Without counsel, the existing rights of children are overlooked and new
rights are not created,109 thereby denying children due process and halting
the advancement of institutional care." 0 The present mental health system,
however, leaves much of a child's advocacy to the parents, a guardian, or
the hospital staff."" In the cases where courts have left the job of protecting
a child's rights to the parents, who must seek private counsel," the courts'
reliance on parents may be illusory because employing counsel may be fi-
nancially impossible for many parents.1 3 Even if the parents have the nec-
essary funds to hire counsel, parents rarely seek redress when the hospital
fails to give proper care to the child or violates the child's rights. Unfortu-
nately, parents tend to give deference to medical staff"' and hospital review
boards," 5 who may not be adequately protecting the child's interests.
Parents of institutionalized children may be unaware of the advantages
and disadvantages of hospitalization or alternative services." 6 Thus, unin-
formed parents may waive their child's due process rights by mistakenly
accepting court orders or consenting to the child's commitment." 7 Under
109. Kleinfeld, supra note 62, at 324.
110. Id.
111. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 607-09 (1979) (The Court found that interests
would be safeguarded by medical judgment, thereby assuming independent medical evaluation,
which may actually be coupled with conflicting interests.). See infra note 112.
112. Rosenberg (pt. 1), supra note 5, at 72 ("[c]ourts may well decide that parents are
able to adequately represent the child's interests and are free to seek counsel in the commu-
nity" when the interests of the parent and child are consistent). The major claimants for the
child are parents, whose prerogatives generally supersede the prerogatives of others. CHILD
ADVOCACY, supra note 19, at 143.
113. See Rosenberg (pt. 1), supra note 5, at 71-72.
114. See Parham, 442 U.S. at 592-95 (the medical staff is involved in the child's admis-
sion and periodic review, but a psychiatrist must make the final admission decision).
115. The patients' constitutionally protected liberty interests are protected by indepen-
dent review boards, which are professional review prior to and after admission or commitment.
Id. But cf. sources cited supra notes 102-03 (questioning the hospital's protection of children's
interests).
116. See, e.g., American Association of Children's Residential Centers, Meeting the
Needs of Children with Serious Emotional Disturbances Through Education for Handicapped
Children Act (PL 94-142); Statement of Problems, Consensus Paper #1 (available from the
NMHA, Alexandria, Virginia) (stating that parents, legal guardians, and surrogate parents
usually do not have the knowledge or skills necessary to effectively advocate for a SED child's
educational needs).
117. Id. See also Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 632 (1979) (Brennan, J., concurring in
part, dissenting in part) (stating that since the parents are uninformed regarding institutional-
ization, their conclusion is not "informed or intelligent").
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the current system, the child or parent can waive counsel in the initial com-
mitment proceeding. 118 Because a child may be hesitant to ask for counsel
if parents and doctors are opposed to intervention, the child's rights should
not be waivable at any stage of the commitment proceeding.," 9 Moreover,
risks are involved with parental waivers when the parent's decisions are in
conflict with the child's well-being because the parents may not be seeking
the best alternative or treatment for the child or they may be seeking insti-
tutionalization as a matter of convenience. Studies suggest that parents are
not always able or willing to act in their child's best interest.120 For exam-
ple, parents may institutionalize their children as a result of incompatibility
with the family, a problem that is unrelated to the child's mental
condition.' 2'
Even if parents do seek counsel or if counsel is provided, representation
is usually only for the purpose of commitment proceedings.' 22 Representa-
tion for indigents in this instance is provided through the public defender's
office.1 23 Unfortunately, overworked public defenders often do not have the
time or knowledge to ascertain alternatives to commitment; thus, public de-
fenders cannot be effective advocates for the protection of institutionalized
children beyond the commitment proceedings.'24 Therefore, the existing
safeguards and representation, such as the parents, hospital, and public de-
fender, may be inadequate. Since these ineffective protections raise the risk
of erroneous liberty deprivation, the institutionalized child's need for effec-
tive counsel becomes even greater.
2. The Value of an Advocacy System for Institutionalized Children
The rights of institutionalized children during confinement will con-
tinue to be violated, with a dim prognosis of an immediate beneficial
118. See Ellis, supra note 6, at 887.
119. Id. (juveniles are less likely to assert a position about his or her welfare).
120. Parham, 442 U.S. at 632 (Brennan, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (ar-
guing that many studies reveal that parental decisions are often not related to the child's
mental condition). The Supreme Court recognized possible conflict of interests and the need
for separate counsel. The Court stated that neither a probation officer nor judge was able to
represent the child due to a conflict of interest in representing both sides. In re Gault, 387 U.S.
1, 36 (1967). See also Kleinfeld, supra note 62, at 347 (conflict of interest exists when parents
seek commitment).
121. Parham, 442 U.S. at 632 (Brennan, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (cit-
ing Murdock, Civil Rights of the Mentally Retarded: Some Critical Issues, 48 NOTRE DAME
LAW 133, 138 (1972); VOGEL & BELL, The Emotionally Disturbed Child as the Family
Scapegoat, in A MODERN INTRODUCTION TO THE FAMILY 412 (N. Bell & E. Vogel ed.
1968)).
122. See supra note 112.
123. See Parker, Lake v. Cameron" Involuntary Civil Commitment Storm Warnings, 4
FAM. L.Q. 81, 85-86 (1970).
124. Id.
Sunderman: The Institutionalized Child's Right to Counsel:  Satisfying Due P
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1989
646 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 23
change, if preferential legislative and judicial attention is not given to vindi-
cating their rights.12 5 Advocacy for institutionalized children is extremely
important to ensure that their rights are upheld, that their care and treat-
ment are adequate, and that their incidental needs are met.126 Proper advo-
cacy of the child's welfare will also lead to a smoother transition both in
and out of the mental hospital, thus aiding in the hospital's rehabilitative
goals rather than compounding the adverse and stigmatizing effects of
institutionalization.
2 7
In Parham v. J.R.,2s the Supreme Court recognized both the risk in-
herent in giving parents total discretion over their child and the value of
advocacy.129 The Court held that this risk of error was sufficiently great to
justify the use of a "neutral factfinder"'5 0 to determine whether statutory
requirements for commitment were satisfied."1 The Court also recognized
the importance of a child's need to have his commitment reviewed periodi-
cally through similar independent procedures.13 2 By recognizing the risk of
complete parental deference in committing the child and the need for peri-
odic review, the Parham case suggests the value of advocacy services on
behalf of children. In fact, the Parham Court suggested that the denial of
protection and advocacy of the children's rights could have violated their
125. Rosenberg (pt. 1), supra note 5, at 70. The National Mental Health Association
firmly states that institutionalized children must be protected and advocacy efforts must be
promoted. Position Paper, supra note 16, at 4.
126. Ellis, supra note 6, at 890. Various functions and needs of counsel for children may
include:
1. Commitment proceedings (usually the role of the public defender);
2. Helping clients settle personal affairs, which may be affected by hospitalization;
a. Taking care of car,
b. Arranging a smooth withdrawal from school,
c. Protecting right to re-enroll,
3. Financial arrangements;
a. Providing for installment payments that may be due,
b. Adjusting property and trust interests,
c. Determining how hospital costs can be met.
Id.
127. See generally CHILD ADVOCACY, supra note 19.
128. 442 U.S. 584 (1979).
129. In Parham, an action was brought by minor children alleging that they had been
deprived of their liberty without procedural due process under a Georgia law, which allowed
voluntary admission of minors to mental hospitals by parents or guardians. Even though the
courts held that this was not per se unconstitutional, the Court recognized the risk of error
inherent in parental decisions to have a child institutionalized for mental health care. Id.
130. Id. at 606. The "neutral factfinder" usually is a staff physician. Id. at 607.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 586. The Court held that subsequent, independent review of the patient's
condition provides a necessary check against possible arbitrariness in the initial admission deci-
sion. Id. at 607 n.15.
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due process rights.Y3
In Parham, Justice Brennan recognized that mentally ill children
should be entitled to at least the same procedural safeguards as adults in
mental institutions, due to the children's vulnerability and impressionabil-
ity.Y34 Representation of children is needed, however, beyond the commit-
ment proceedings and periodic reviews. An advocate would provide con-
tinuity and stability for the child throughout their confinement, unlike the
current system's sporadic visits of many social service workers'"5 and law-
yers. The advocate would provide the child with an ongoing relation-
ship--one that does not end abruptly and one upon which a child can
rely. 3" In addition, while the hospital staff must be primarily concerned
with the child's care inside the institution, an advocate would continue to
seek follow-up care once the child is discharged. Further, the parent and
child who are frustrated with the mental health system or unaware of the
possible services would have available assistance. Thus, institutionalized
mentally ill children would be receiving the valuable procedural safeguards
that courts already grant to adults.
Full-time advocates are needed within institutions to constantly inspect
the machinery of bureaucracy. Institutions must be monitored to see that
the institution presents requests and priorities that reflect the true needs of
children who are without their parents or who, because of handicap or spe-
cial needs, cannot speak for themselves. 37 Even for those children who have
parents making decisions, independent review by the advocate is needed to
ensure that the child is in the least restrictive environment. Unlike an ad-
versary position, an advocate reinforces proper behavior on the part of the
133. The Court stated that the district court on remand may consider whether hospital
procedures for periodic review of patients' needs for care are sufficient. Id. at 617. For the
balancing factors used to determine if due process was given under the state procedures, see id.
at 599-600.
134. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 627-28 & n.7-8 (1979) (Brennan, J., concurring in
part, dissenting in part). See also, CHILD ADVOCACY, supra note 19, at 7-8, which states that:
[C]hild advocacy sees the child as an individual with a certain potential which is mark-
edly influenced over time by the quality of the child's interaction with his own environ-
ment. . . . The child is vulnerable and needs help in growing up. He is not helped by
being punished or demeaned for practicing the bad habits he has learned from his
environment.
Id.
135. See Butz, supra note 24, at 1216, 1244 (referring to the representation of abused
children).
136. Id.
137. CHILD ADVOCACY, supra note 19, at 95. For specific roles and steps in implement-
ing advocacy programs, see id. at 106-22. See also CRISIS IN CHILD MENTAL HEALTH, infra
note 228, at 15-25; PSYCHIATRIC PATIENT RIGHTS AND PATIENT ADVOCACY, supra note 4, at
27-29 (various available types of advocacy programs found in institutions in general).
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hospital service delivery staff. 138 Advocates can negotiate for change di-
rectly with those responsible for the child's interests on a daily basis if
change is needed."39 An in-house, yet independent, advocate also serves as
an intercessor to the institution's professionals in order to explain the resi-
dents' needs . 40 The mere presence of an advocate improves the hospital's
quality of treatment and programming and is a reminder of the residents'
rights.' 4 ' Because the protection and advocacy services could resolve
problems without adversary proceedings, provide services without the child
actively seeking them, and be available without charge, a protection and
advocacy program for children would be highly valuable. 42
IV. IMPLEMENTING ADVOCACY SERVICES TO INSTITUTIONALIZED
CHILDREN THROUGH THE EXPANSION OF THE PROTECTION AND
ADVOCACY FOR MENTALLY ILL INDIVIDUALS ACT OF 1986
In 1986, Congress passed the Protection and Advocacy for Mentally Ill
Individuals Act (P&A Act). 4 ' Congress' goal was to meet the advocacy
and protective needs of the mentally ill that had not been effectively met. 44
Other goals of the Act were to increase patient, staff, policymaker, and
community awareness of patient rights, thus hopefully leading to an effec-
tive response to mentally ill patients' needs and concerns. 45
The P&A Act was passed in response to the inadequate existing
mental health services provided in institutions for the mentally ill."4 Prior
to the Act's passage, state regulatory systems that existed monitored the
hospital's compliance with state law in respect to the rights of the mentally
ill, but those systems were inadequate in investigating complaints, ineffec-
138. See Ziegenfuss & Lasky, Attitudes Toward Mental Patients' Rights: Program
Modes and the Ideology of Nurses, 14 J. OF PSYCHIATRY & L. 469, 474 (1986). This study
suggests that the presence of an attorney results in more staff awareness of patient rights and
more involvement in conflict resolution regarding patient rights issues. Id. These conflicts are
usually initiated by lawyers questioning the program's policies and practices. Id.
139. Deciding if representation is needed must be consistent and not decided on a case-
by-case basis as in Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 788 (1973).
140. CHILD ADVOCACY, supra note 19, at 97.
141. Ziegenfuss, supra note 138, at 474.
142. "Advocacy could be the catalyst for a lasting and productive reformation." CHILD
ADVOCACY, supra note 19, at 92. See also id. at 91 (explaining why advocacy is essential in
institutions). But cf. id. at 96 (giving reasons against advocacy).
143. Pub. L. No. 99-319, 100 Stat. 478 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 247(a) & §§ 10801-51
(1987)).
144. S. Rep. 109, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEws 1361, 1362. For a summary of the Act, see P&A Summary, supra note 5, at 2 (discuss-
ing why protection and advocacy is needed).
145. See Scallet, supra note 23, at 17. See also P&A Summary, supra note 5, at 2.
146. U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws, supra note 144, at 1362-63.
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tive in disciplinary actions, and inconsistent in application. 47 Furthermore,
although the quality of care in many state psychiatric facilities are subject
to external review by the private Joint Commission on Accreditation of
Hospitals (JCAH) and the Health Care Financing Administration
(HCFA), Congress was not satisfied.'48 Congress considered these reviews
insufficient due to the predictability of visits by the JCAH and the HCFA.
Additionally, Congress focused on the hospital's capacity to provide treat-
ment, instead of the treatment and care actually provided.' 49
Since the JCAH and HCFA programs were inadequate, Congress re-
quired the P&A systems to be implemented through a program that is inde-
pendent of any service provider'"0 and specific to the patients' mental health
needs.'' The P&A Act accomplishes these goals by authorizing designated
agencies and review boards to pursue legal, administrative, and other ap-
propriate remedies to ensure the protection of the institutionalized mentally
ill and to provide the monies to accomplish these actions. 52 In addition, the
P&A Act provides funds for advocacy services to protect the patients' ex-
isting state and federal rights. 53
Some administrative aspects of the P&A program are expressly men-
tioned in the Act. According to the Act, the federal government will pro-
147. Id. (Much of this insufficiency was due to the lack of financial resources.) Also, the
limited authority given to advocates seriously impeded the effectiveness of protecting the men-
tally ill. Id. See also P&A Summary, supra note 5, at 2.
148. U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS, supra note 144, at 1362-63.
149. Id.
150. Id. The P&A agency cannot duplicate the efforts of a guardian, conservator, or
legal representative unless the guardian requests counsel or fails to act in the child's best
interest within a reasonable time. P&A Summary, supra note 5, at 5.
151. National Institute of Mental Health, Fiscal Year Report on the Protection and
Advocacy Program for Mentally Ill Individuals (1986) (unpublished report submitted to the
Department of Health and Human Services pursuant to the P&A Act breaking down the
dollar appropriations made by each state). The Act seeks to keep the P&A money separate
from other existing DDA Act programs that have already been established for persons with
developmental disabilities, severe handicaps, and rehabilitation programs for the elderly so
that the mentally ill are not overlooked. Id. The intent of the P&A Act is to cover any residen-
tial facility that provides care or treatment for individuals who have a significant mental illness
or emotional impairment, which would allow monies also for children. P&A Summary, supra
note 5, at 2.
152. The monies are provided under the P&A Act and are to be used to supplement
existing non-federally supported resources or programs for the protection and advocacy of the
mentally ill. Id. at 3-6. See also Scallet, supra note 23, at 19 (stating that the future of federal
advocacy funding is uncertain due to federal budget pressures). Despite severe funding
problems for mental health programs generally, the potential is high for mental health advo-
cacy to join with similar programs for other disabled or disadvantaged populations, which have
experienced a continuing, slow growth in the past several years. Id. With the establishment of
programs in each state, advocacy likely will continue to expand as an integral feature of the
mental health system. Id.
153. P&A Summary, supra note 5, at 1.
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vide funding to the P&A program, a branch of the National Institute of
Mental Health (NIMH) Alcohol, Drug Abuse, and Mental Health Admin-
stration. The P&A program then supervises the state P&A systems that are
implemented and provides states with the technical assistance'" necessary
to implement an effective P&A program. 155 Congress, as suggested by the
Labor and Resources Committee who wrote the P&A Act, chose the ex-
isting Developmental Disabilities Assistance and Bill of Rights Act's (DDA
Act) 56 protection and advocacy services to effectuate the legislative goals
of the P&A Act because of the DDA Act system's past accomplish-
ments. 157 Even though Congress chose to utilize the DDA Act's services,
Congress designed the P&A Act to separate the services to be offered to the
mentally ill from the existing developmental disability services. 15 8 Initially,
the funds allocated to the P&A program under the Act are distributed to
this preexisting DDA Act agency, which was designated by each state gov-
ernor.' 59 These agencies may then subcontract the mental health services to
other state agencies or nonprofit organizations6 ° that currently do not pro-
vide services to the mentally ill.'
The P&A program at the NIMH, which is a program in response to
the P&A Act, coordinates the funding and technical assistance to the state
P&A systems.' 62 The typical P&A program, in every state and in the
United States' six territories, 63 is a small not-for-profit organization.6 The
NIMH, through the Alcohol, Drug Abuse, and Mental Health Administra-
tion's P&A system, grants money to state P&A systems to be used specifi-
cally for mentally ill patients; 6 however, the NIMH does not set regula-
tions for the state P&A systems. 66 Thus, the implementation of the Act is
154. See Scallet, supra note 23, at 19 (summarizing the type of technical assistance
given).
155. See U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS, supra note 144, at 1363.
156. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6001-81 (1982 & Supp. 11 1984).
157. See U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS, supra note 144, at 1363.
158. Id. at 1362.
159. P&A Summary, supra note 5, at 3.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 4 (however, DDA agencies may subcontract to existing organizations that
provide advocacy services to the mentally ill).
162. Telephone interview with Natalie Reatig, Coordinator of the Protection and Advo-
cacy Program at the NIMH (Mar. 3, 1988) (stating that she provides contract information,
program material, and gives her interpretation of the Act to states that ask for explanations).
Whenever the Act refers to "Secretary," this refers to Natalie Reatig's position. Id.
163. Id.
164. Only six to eight states have a state government office. Id.
165. The NIMH received $10,555,000 from Congress. Id. This money is a separate
budget appropriation from the DDA Act funds that the original P&A system receives for the
developmentally disabled. The DDA Act funds are to be used for the developmentally dis-
abled; the NIMH funds are to be used for the mentally ill. Id.
166. Interview, supra note 162. Natalie Reatig stated that there was not enough time
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left to the states' discretion and their individual advisory boards, which
should be a part of each P&A system.""7
The P&A Act is the answer to many of the problems that an institu-
tionalized mentally ill person faces. However, even though the Act is
designed to represent all mentally ill individuals, 68 the Act's implementa-
tion fails to properly protect children who are mentally ill.169 Although the
Act enables the P&A program to provide services to children, 70 many state
systems have failed to provide adequate P&A services to institutionalized
children.171 P&A monies may be used to fund P&A services in facilities for
children, but due to the lack of time and money, adults usually are given
priority.' 72 Therefore, the P&A programs must rely on the hospital staff to
protect the child's interests by reporting any abuse or neglect of these inter-
ests caused by the child's guardian or parent.17 3 However, rarely will a hos-
pital staff person intervene when the parents do not represent the child's
interests, because the parent may later initiate an action against the hospi-
tal.174 Because states have interpreted and implemented the P&A program
in different and ineffective ways,' 75 an amendment explicitly including chil-
dren, with clear guidelines set by the NIMH, must be implemented and
enforced. The institutionalized child will then receive the appropriate and
needed advocacy services, thereby satisfying the due process requirements
of the fourteenth amendment.
V. PROPOSED GUIDELINES
States must have some deference in implementing the P&A program
in accordance with local preferences, policies, and patients' needs. However,
since children do not have a strong influence in lobbying for services that
and resources to set regulations. Instead, her office works with the state P&A systems in prob-
lem-solving, policy interpretation, and material distribution. Id.
167. Id. Also, the National Alliance for the Mentally Ill is proposing amendments to the
Act to require that the advisory boards are correctly utilized, since there have been various
problems with board appointments. Interview with Richard Greer, Deputy Executive Director
of The National Alliance for The Mentally 11, Arlington, Virginia (Mar. 9, 1988).
168. 42 U.S.C. § 10802(3)(A)(B) (1986).
169. Interview, supra note 162.
170. 42 U.S.C. § 10807(a) (1986) (states generally that the P&A program can take
administrative and legal action if proper action is not being taken on behalf of a mentally ill
person).
171. Interview, supra note 162 (stating that institutionalized children are an under-
served population).
172. Id. (stating that the advisory boards set the priorities).
173. "There is no law to allow us to intervene. We cannot take cases over parental
objections unless it is an egregious case." Id. "The NIMH's P&A program can only hope that
state P&A systems offer services to children." Id.
174. Rosenberg, supra note 5, at 72.
175. Interview, supra note 162.
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are legally available to them but not actually provided, the proposed guide-
lines should be required before the NIMH gives a state P&A system any
funding or technical assistance. The following are the proposed guidelines
that state P&A systems should implement:
1. The availability of P&A services on a daily basis to respond to pa-
tient, parent, staff, and court requests, which begin immediately after the
child is institutionalized and continue during immediate follow-up care.
(The P&A program may be staffed by individuals such as social workers,
concerned parents, law students, and at least one attorney, depending on
the local needs);
2. Frequent monitoring of the hospital's care to children in regard to
the quality of the hospital's facilities, treatment programs, and educational
services. Since children are often unsure about what protections and ser-
vices are available, the advocate would provide monitoring without being
requested;
3. Frequent visitations by the advocate with the institutionalized child
to ensure that the legal needs of the child are being effectively met by the
child's parents or guardian and the hospital system. If the parents, guard-
ian, or hospital are not complying with the law, the advocate would first
negotiate with the institution for the change. If the parents, guardian, or
hospital failed to respond to the child's needs, the advocate may then pur-
sue appropriate remedial legal action;
4. Making any necessary complaints to state hospital boards or the
JCAH, who are only able to make infrequent visits, if the institution fails to
comply with their regulations;
5. Working with the parents, while maintaining the attorney-client re-
lationship with the child, to settle the child's personal affairs that may be
affected by hospitalization. However, if the parents do not act in the child's
best interest, the advocate could proceed independently; and
6. Ensuring that the children's hospitalization remains the least restric-
tive environment and that proper follow-up care is being pursued. Thus,
advocates would represent the child before commitment review boards and
would periodically and independently review the commitment.
Expanding the P&A Act would offer children the necessary advocacy
services to represent their best interests and monitor the institution's quality
of care, while at the same time ensuring that the child's rights are not vio-
lated. Even though problems may arise in the Act's implementation, these
problems should be dealt with on a case-by-case basis instead of denying
children legal representation all together. 176 Otherwise, the child's best in-
176. See infra notes 205-32 and accompanying text regarding problems with granting a
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terests will be overlooked in order to avoid possible conflicts, conflicts that
are minor when weighed against a child's liberty rights.
VI. AN EXEMPLARY IMPLEMENTATION OF THE P&A ACT FOR
CHILDREN: MONITORING THE INSTITUTION'S EDUCATIONAL SERVICES
The inadequate educational services that many institutions provide for
mentally ill children is one of the most detrimental problems facing an in-
stitutionalized child. Since both the government and the child have a strong
interest in continuing the child's proper education, an advocate is needed to
pursue these interests. Through the proposed guidelines and amendment,
the advocate will be able to both detect violations of a child's educational
rights and pursue the child's best interest. As an example of how the pro-
posed guidelines can be implemented, this section of the note briefly illus-
trates how an advocate could monitor an institution's educational services.
Mental institutions have historically failed to provide patients with an
adequate education. The absence of an adequate education in mental insti-
tutions, therefore, has been a matter of serious concern.'x Since education
is closely related to the mental health of children,' 78 proper education can
be effective both in preventing emotional and mental disorders and in pro-
moting the healthy growth and development of children.179 Even though the
importance of a child's education is recognized, 180 the child does not have a
constitutional right to an education.18' However, although inequality of ed-
child advocacy services.
177. See National Mental Health Association, Legislative Goals for the 100th Congress
... and Beyond (unpublished material that is available from the NMHA office in Alexandria,
Virginia) (stating that education for SED children is a big concern of the Congress).
178. Final Report of the Joint Commission on Mental Health of Children, Inc., Digest
of Crisis in Child Mental Health: Challenge for the 70s 33 (1969). See generally CIUSIS IN
CHILD MENTAL HEALTH, infra note 228, at 383-404 (discussing the role that education plays
in mental health).
179. See sources cited supra note 178.
180. The Supreme Court in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954)
stated:
Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state and local governments.
Compulsory school attendance laws and the great expenditures for education both
demonstrate our recognition of the importance of education to our democratic society. It
is required in the performance of our most basic public responsibilities, even service in
the armed forces. It is the very foundation of good citizenship. Today, it is a principal
instrument in awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing him for later profes-
sional training, and in helping him to adjust normally to his environment. In these days,
it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied
the opportunity of an education. Such an opportunity, where the state has undertaken to
provide it, is a right which must be made available to all on equal terms.
Id.
181. The Supreme Court has not held that education is a fundamental right. San
Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35 (1973). However, once educational
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ucation alone, when education is provided, may not create a cause of ac-
tion,18 it can be argued that some level of minimal educational opportunity
might be considered a constitutional right. 83 Federal courts have held that
the deprivation of a proper education is unconstitutional if a state denies
education to a class of individuals. 184 In response to these decisions, both
federal and state legislatures have enacted legislation that provides special
educational services to all handicapped children; this includes many institu-
tionalized children as well. 185 However, the problem of institutionalized
children receiving an adequate education remains pervasive because the
majority of psychiatric hospitals offer only minimal, if any, educational ser-
vices, and the education that is provided is often improper and
inadequate.'86
Currently, adequate remedies that would guarantee an institutionalized
rights are granted, they cannot be terminated without due process safeguards. Goss v. Lopez,
419 U.S. 565 (1975).
182. See, e.g., San Antonio Indep. School Dist., 411 U.S. at 35. Poor families brought
an action challenging a state law as violative of their fourteenth amendment equal protection
rights. Id. at 4-5. They believed that the imposition of a property tax would hurt the education
of their children because their school would receive less funding than upper-income residential
schools. Id. Even though education is extremely important, the Court did not recognize equal
protection problems. The Court felt that the imposition of taxes was a legislative role "and one
for which the court lacks both authority and competence." Id. at 30-31.
183. Id. at 36-37 (the Court suggests that "some identifiable quantum of education"
may be required).
184. Mills v. Board of Education, 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972). The Mills court
stated that failure to provide education to children with behavior problems is a violation of due
process under the 14th amendment. Id. at 867. Also, if the inadequacies in education bear
more on an exceptional child than on a normal child, equal protection issues are raised. Id. at
874. The Court in San Antonio Indep. School Dist., 411 U.S. at 36, stated that some educa-
tion is a prerequisite to the meaningful exercise of first amendment rights.
185. See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 43-1-18 (1978).
A minor who is a client in a residential facility shall be provided such education and
training as necessary to encourage and stimulate developmental progress and achieve-
ment. Such minor shall be educated in regular classes with nonhandicapped minors
whenever appropriate. In no event shall a minor be allowed to remain in a residential
facility for more than thirty days without receiving educational services.
Id. See infra text accompanying notes 194-99 for a discussion of the Handicapped Children
Act.
186. See infra notes 187-98 and accompanying text. See also Special Project, A Policy
Analysis of "Least Restrictive" Education of Handicapped Children, 14 RUTGERS L.J. 489,
498 (1983) (the Handicapped Children Act fails to provide educational programs to some
institutionalized children). The statute, like N.M. STAT. ANN. § 43-1-18 (1978), gives the
institution thirty days to provide education. By allowing a thirty day lapse, these statutes have
failed to consider the importance of a child's education remaining consistent. Other states also
lack continual education programs for institutionalized children. American Association of
Children's Residential Center, Meeting the Needs of Children With Serious Emotional Distur-
bances Through Education for Handicapped Children Act (PL 94-142), Consensus Paper #3
(unpublished material available from the NMHA). Consequently, if a child returns to classes
he will probably be behind and then further stigmatized.
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child a proper education do not exist. Review board activity'87 may lead to
educational improvements, but the change may be too late; therefore, more
immediate relief is necessary. 88 Many hospitals depend on the JCAH to
review the constitutionality and adequacy of the mental hospital's proce-
dures and care, but these reviews are rare and usually ineffective.189 Also,
these procedures and other beneficial programs'9" that are offered to ensure
an adequate education for mentally handicapped children must be insti-
gated by the parent or guardian, who may be overwhelmed by the proce-
dural difficulties.' 9' However, if the institutionalized child does not have
parents and is a ward of the state, the child is usually left unrepresented by
an advocate, guardian, or surrogate parent.19' Unfortunately, "[t]he entire
procedure cannot work without an assertive, questioning advocate for the
child," because the child is unable to protect the rights that his parents and
the hospital have failed to protect.'93
The most recent step taken by the government to ensure an adequate
education to mentally ill children is The Handicapped Children Act. 94 The
Handicapped Children Act substantively guarantees a right to free appro-
priate public education and "related services" to seriously emotionally dis-
turbed (SED) children 95 in residential facilities.' 96 Many children in
187. See Education of the Handicapped Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-61 (1982) (explaining
review boards). See also Note, supra note 186, at 499-500 (frequently now represented by
school advisory panels).
188. Without adequate procedural safeguards, available relief and review may only re-
sult in a continuation of existing programs or a new hearing. Fialkowski v. Shapp, 405 F.
Supp. 946, 957 (E.D. Pa. 1975). The Fialkowski court recognized relief under the Civil Rights
Act § 1983 for the exclusion of individuals from school, but there are no adequate safeguards
to prevent this total exclusion of education. Id. However, the proposed advocacy system could
prevent total exclusion of education.
189. Rosenberg, supra note 5, at 71.
190. The NIMH has a new program called the Child and Adolescent Service System
Program (CASSP) in twenty-four states promoting concepts and strategies for changing the
service systems to meet the needs of SED children. Interview, supra note 162. However, these
are not mandatory programs.
191. THE RIGHTS OF CHILDREN: LEGAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES 235 (J.
Henning ed. 1982). See also id. at 238-39 (regarding the clout parents are given in the imple-
mentation of the Handicapped Children Act, but that parents are unprepared to "take the
task").
192. Special Project, supra note 186, at 499. Therefore, an institutionalized child re-
ceives less protection than children in either neglect proceedings or criminal proceedings.
193. THE RIGHTS OF CHILDREN: LEGAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES, supra note
191, at 235.
194. 20 U.S.C. § 1400-61 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
195. Seriously Emotionally Disturbed Children, 34 C.F.R. § 300.5(8) (1988).
[i] This term means a condition exhibiting one or more of the following characteristics
over a long period of time and to a marked degree, which adversely affects educational
performance:
A. An inability to learn which cannot be explained by intellectual, sensory, or health
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mental hospitals fit this description; 197 yet, even if they are covered under
this Act, children in many mental institutions remain deprived of a mini-
mally adequate education, because hospitals and school boards have failed
to sufficiently implement the statute or Act.198 Because of this failure to
properly effectuate these new laws, both SED children and other institu-
tionalized mentally ill children who are not covered by the Act are deprived
factors;
B. An inability to build or maintain satisfactory interpersonal relationships with
peers and teachers;
C. Inappropriate types of behavior or feelings under normal circumstances;
D. A general pervasive mood of unhappiness or depression; or
E. A tendency to develop physical symptoms or fears associated with personal or
school problems.
Id.
However, each state interprets this definition of SED children differently. Georgetown
University Child Development Center, A Community Workbook for Developing Collaborative
Services for Seriously Disturbed Children 4 (Mar. 1985). The unclear definition results in a
tremendous disparity of the Act's application throughout the states. American Association of
Children's Residential Centers, supra note 116, at Consensus Paper #2.
196. The Handicapped Children Act has provided handicapped children (including the
seriously emotionally disturbed) adequate facilities and education and advisory boards to safe-
guard these educational interests. The Act gives parents an advocacy role in the educational
planning for their child and a right to a de novo hearing in federal court to review the ade-
quacy of the proposed educational placement. Those children who are wards of the state or
institutionalized are usually deprived of parental advocacy as a vital resource. Rosenberg (pt.
2), infra note 223, at 146.
Therefore, the Act mandates the appointment of a surrogate parent for administrative
appeals to protect the child's rights. The surrogate parent program could supplement the ex-
isting minimal services to a child with an individual program designed to meet the child's
needs. Rosenberg (pt. 1), supra note 5, at 73. But, school districts have failed to make such
appointments or have done so insufficiently. Id. (courts have named surrogates whose interests
conflict with the child). See also Haggerty & Sacks, Education of the Handicapped: Towards
a Definition of an Appropriate Education, 50 TEMPLE L.Q. 961, 984, 989-93 (1977) (review
and critique of the Act).
197. Interview with Mary Crosby, Assistant Director for Governmental Affairs, Ameri-
can Academy of Child Psychiatry (Mar. 8, 1988) (stating that mentally ill children in hospi-
tals are covered if defined as SED. However, "[i]t is a case-by-case determination, depending
on the school district and what the parents want.").
198. Id. By failing to provide institutionalized children with proper public supported ed-
ucation, school boards have violated their own statutes and regulations. Mills v. Board of
Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866, 874 (D.D.C. 1972). Even when the Mills court imposed a duty on
the defendant school board, the defendants continually failed to produce necessary proposals
and plans for the alleviation of the problems posed. "This lack of communication, cooperation
and plan is typical" and contributes to the existing problem. Id. at 873. In Mills, a special
master was appointed to insure that the institution would provide adequate education when the
institution failed to abide by a court order. Id. at 877. Therefore, an advocate is needed to
pursue the child's interest effectively. See, e.g., id. at 869-70 (cases depicting educational dep-
rivation to children with behavior problems in and out of institutions); Fialkowski v. Shapp,
405 F. Supp. 946 (E.D. Pa. 1975) (complete denial of educational opportunities for retarded
children).
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of a proper education. Therefore, these children need an advocate to pursue
appropriate educational services for them.Y99
By following the proposed guidelines to the P&A Act, an advocate
could monitor the enforcement or take the necessary actions to guarantee
that laws promoting the education of handicapped children are upheld. An
advocate could bring an equal protection claim by arguing that an institu-
tionalized child should be considered a suspect class200 and that the lack of
education interferes with a constitutionally protected right.201 If the state is
involved, such as a public hospital, the P&A advocate could seek civil rights
damages under section 1983,202 where there was a direct causal link be-
tween some official conduct and a constitutional deprivation of a child's
rights.20 3 Thus, an advocate would be able to bring an action against the
directors of school boards, the Department of Health and Human Services,
the mental hospital and its doctors, or even the JCAH, all of whom may be
liable for the denial of a minimally adequate education if the denial is with-
out good faith.2 '
199. See infra notes 228-32 and accompanying text.
200. A suspect class is a group of individuals who have been subjected to purposeful
unequal treatment or relegated to a position of political powerlessness as to command ex-
traordinary protection. San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973).
The mentally retarded are considered an inherently suspect class who should be more pro-
tected. Fialkowski, 405 F. Supp. at 959. But see City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center
Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985) (stating that the mentally retarded are a quasi-suspect class).
201. In an equal protection claim, the state law must disadvantage a suspect class for
the strict scrutiny test to apply. For example, state action must impinge on the child's exercise
of a fundamental constitutional right or liberty interest that is protected by the constitution in
order to bring a suit. Id. Even though equal protection arguments exceed the scope of this
note, it is mentioned as an alternative claim that an advocate could pursue.
202. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982); Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981) (section 1983
action based on official conduct that deprives a person of constitutional rights). These civil
rights actions are outside the scope of this note, but are examples of the various claims that a
P&A advocate could pursue.
203. Parratt, 451 U.S. at 535.
204. Fialkowski v. Shapp, 405 F. Supp. 946, 956 (E.D. Pa. 1975). In Fialkowski, The
Secretary of Education was found personally responsible because he had full authority to cor-
rect the alleged violations committed by school districts. Therefore, the court held the Secre-
tary of Education liable. Id. at 959. If monetary relief is sought, however, the personal involve-
ment requirement is more stringent. Id. at 956. Few damage actions have been brought in
these types of cases due to the costs and improbability of success in addition to the fact that
compensation is based on the child's economic status. Thus, neither counsel nor parents may
want to expend the time, money, and effort in bringing an action. However, damage actions
can be won. Rosenberg (pt. 1), supra note 5, at 71-72.
Sunderman: The Institutionalized Child's Right to Counsel:  Satisfying Due P
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1989
658 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 23
VII. ARGUMENTS AGAINST AN INSTITUTIONALIZED CHILD'S RIGHT TO
COUNSEL AND How THE ACT'S PROPOSED EXPANSION TO
INSTITUTIONALIZED CHILDREN MITIGATES THESE PROBLEMS
Two main concerns arise in expanding the P&A Act. First, since the
suggested expansion provides separate counsel for the institutionalized
child, slight interference with the parent-child relationship may occur be-
cause someone other than the parent will be making decisions affecting the
child's health and disposition. Thus, usurpation of the parent's traditional
role of decision-making and inherent discretion over the child's care is
feared.205 Second, since the specific extension of the P&A Act to children
may require more governmental funding, the unavailability of financial re-
sources is a possible argument against the proposed amendment to the
P&A Act.2°6 However, both of these problems can be mitigated and should,
therefore, not be an excuse for not providing protection and advocacy ser-
vices to institutionalized children.207
Both parents and courts may be hesitant to allow the daily availability
of protection and advocacy services because the child's interests and needs
may be adverse to the parents' and hospital's interests and decisions.208 Pa-
rental discretion is viewed as an inherent right that is deeply rooted in his-
tory,209 but courts will interfere with the parent-child relationship under the
205. "Authority of parents cannot be usurped. It is dangerous to step in between a child
and his parents." Telephone interview with Natalie Reatig, Alcohol, Drug Abuse, and Mental
Health Administration (Nov. 1987) (regarding the extension of protection and advocacy ser-
vices under the P&A Act to children). See also Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602-04 (1979)
(The Court was concerned with the government superseding parental authority and the paren-
tal decisions regarding their child's health by providing a child with counsel in a commitment
proceeding.). But cf. Simet, Power, Uncertainty, and Choice: The Voluntary Commitment of
Children, Parham v. J.R., 20 U.W. ONT. L. REv. 141, 144-45 (1982) (criticizing Chief Justice
Burger's justification of parental discretion and avoidance of state intrusion in Parham). "Due
to the social importance of the family, most legislation regulating family life aims to minimize
state intrusion and preserve family integrity." Butz, supra note 24, at 1218-19 & n.24.
206. National Mental Health Association, Severely Emotionally Disturbed Children:
Improving Services Under Education of the Handicapped Act (P.L. 94-142) 11, Meeting Re-
port of Sept. 1986 [hereinafter Meeting Report] (regarding the high rate of teacher burnout
and turnover, as well as the lack of funding for the SED population). The institutions for SED
children will be "hard-pressed for money." Interview, supra note 197. See also Note, supra
note 1, at 1285 (stating that the requirement of counsel will incur additional expenses and
lengthen hearings).
207. However, the cost alone should not be the basis for denying the individual's impor-
tant procedural protections. Id. at n.124. See infra notes 208-32 and accompanying text (dis-
cussion of resolving the problems).
208. See infra notes 209-10 & 215 and accompanying text.
209. See Dobson, The Juvenile Court and Parental Rights, 4 FAM. L.Q. 393, 394-96
(1970) (regarding the history and nature of inherent parental rights). However, these rights
should not be discarded unless the parents cannot or do not discharge their reciprocal duties
toward the child. Id. at 396. But cf. Guggenheim, The Right to be Represented but not Heard:
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common law parens patriae doctrine when the child's physical or mental
health may be jeopardized. 10 In these situations, the court's aim in step-
ping into the parental role is not to punish the parent, but rather to nurture
and protect the child.211 Thus, in certain circumstances, the courts have
deemed that providing counsel is not only just, but is required by law for
the child's welfare.212
The argument that providing a child with counsel will automatically
usurp a strong parent-child relationship fails to consider the fact that the
family autonomy may have already been disrupted.1 3 The parent-child re-
lationship is strained when the parents decide to surrender custody of their
child to a mental institution, albeit with good or bad intentions. Further-
more, the issues and rights of a child in an institution do not involve the
routine childrearing decisions normally expected within the context of an
ongoing family relationship. 1 4 Therefore, a skilled advocate who represents
the child should not threaten the parents' authority; instead, the advocate
would attempt to work with the parents to ensure that the child is receiving
proper care and to ensure that the child's rights are not being violated.
When a parent does not have the child's best interests at heart,1 5 an
advocate would ensure that the child's interests were properly represented.
If parents are truly acting in the child's best interest, measures taken to
protect their child will not be protested. However, even if parents permit an
Reflections on Legal Representation for Children, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 76, 109-17 (1984) (ar-
guments against state interference).
210. Dobson, supra note 209, at 393. Parens patriae is the state's power to be a guard-
ian to persons under legal disability. Parens patriae is justified only for the concern over the
child's welfare. Id. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 603 (1979) (The state may have constitu-
tional control over parental discretion.).
211. Dobson, supra note 209, at 393. However, incidental punishment may be "inevita-
ble and even just if one agrees with studies which place the blame for all that has gone wrong
with our children on the failure of the natural home to foster and perfect the young." Id. at
393-94.
212. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1966); Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966). For a
discussion of these cases, see supra notes 50-60 and accompanying text.
213. Parham, 442 U.S. at 631 (Brennan, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part); The
Supreme Court, 1978 Term, supra note 51, at 93-94 (also stating that in past state family
intervention, no family disruption is shown).
214. Parham, 442 U.S. at 631 (Brennan, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (In-
stitutionalization is a break in family autonomy when the parent surrenders custody to the
institution, thus the child is in greater need of counsel.). Justice Brennan felt that "a child who
has been ousted from his family has even greater need for an independent advocate" because
of the child's right to be free from wrongful incarceration, physical intrusion, and stigmitiza-
tion. Id.
215. See supra notes 104, 120-21, 213 and accompanying text. "It ignores reality to
assume blindly that parents act in their children's best interests" in making decisions regarding
their children's hospitalization. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 632 (1979) (Brennan, J., con-
curring in part, dissenting in part).
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advocate's representation to engender anger and hostility toward their child,
the incidental interference with the parent-child relationship should not pre-
vent the child from receiving the necessary protections provided by an advo-
cate.2"' Since inpatient treatment in a mental hospital is "the most drastic
mode of mental health care, 21 7 the government should closely scrutinize
the parents' decision to hospitalize their children.2 1 8 When the parents are
providing adequate supervision, active advocacy is not needed. Thus, the
parents should not have a problem supporting the protection and advocacy
services. However, if the parents fail to protect the child's rights and fail to
meet the child's needs, usurpation of the parents' authority would be neces-
sary to preserve the child's due process rights.
The implementation of protection and advocacy services for institution-
alized children could adequately protect children's constitutional rights and
interests. Furthermore, these services could be implemented without unnec-
essarily interfering with parental authority and without undercutting any
legitimate interests of the state and patient that are being served by the
child's hospitalization. Providing children with P&A services would elimi-
nate the problems associated with formalized factual hearings or adver-
sarial proceedings. These problems include significant intrusion into the
parent-child relationship, exacerbating whatever tensions already exist, and
causing the subsequent return of the child to the home to be more diffi-
cult.2 19 Instead, the guidelines would provide advocacy services to reassure
the child that counsel is available on a daily basis, to ensure proper care by
the hospital, and to safeguard against violations of the child's rights. Fur-
thermore, the advocate would act independently in the child's best interest
rather than being in the middle of a power struggle between the child and
the hospital or parents.2  In contrast to potentially harmful adversarial
proceedings, the proposed extension of the P&A Act would provide thera-
peutic advocacy because children would have an opportunity to express
their views and take an active part in their rehabilitation. 2
216. See Simet, supra note 205, at 151.
217. Id. at 150.
218. Morris, The Supreme Court Examines Civil Commitment Issues: A Retrospective
and Prospective Assessment, 60 TULANE L. REv. 927, 947 (1986) (stating that Justice Bren-
nan in Parham cited numerous studies of inappropriate attempts by parents to institutionalize
their children, who were not in need of such drastic treatment).
219. Parham, 442 U.S. at 610 (The Court expressed its concern that an adversary con-
frontation would distress the parents and have a negative impact on a disturbed child.).
220. Power struggles between the child's counsel and the parents and/or the hospital
may have a detrimental impact on the hospital's ordered treatment. See Ellis, supra note 6, at
890.
221. The knowledge that someone on the "outside" is concerned about the child's well-
being may be one of the most valuable things an advocate can give a child-client. Id. See also
Simet, supra note 205, at 151 (stating that children who do not express their views are likely
to feel alienated both from their parents and the hospital that is rendering treatment).
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The child's right to counsel, adequate education, and treatment are all
needs that would be met by the proposed amendment and guidelines. How-
ever, the expansion of a government program is usually accompanied by
financial concerns and limited federal dollars.2 2 This concern is dealt with
through several avenues,223 but most specifically through the P&A Act..224
Courts have held that the lack of funding is an insufficient basis for
denying children their rights,225 because constitutional rights must be af-
forded despite the greater expenses involved. 226 Therefore, the implications
of denying children their rights by inadequate due process must be strongly
considered when using the insufficiency of funding as an excuse. Children's
interests need to be given timely attention and priority due to the children's
222. The major problem with the implementation of The Handicapped Children Act is
the inadequacy of resources on both the state and local level. Federal appropriations have
consistently been far below authorized levels. National Mental Health Association, supra note
206, at 3. See also Rosenberg (pt. 2), infra note 223, at 145. (Federal dollars for community-
based services for minors were approximately $20 million a year between 1972 and 1980.
Today, there is no federal policy on adolescent mental health care.).
223. Medicaid has a program entitled Early Periodic Screening, Diagnosis, and Treat-
ment (EPSDT) that places an affirmative obligation on the state government to ensure that
eligible children under the Medicaid statute actually receive the services they need. Rosenberg
& Yohalem, Litigation on Behalf of Mentally Disabled Children: Targets of Opportunity (pt.
2), 10 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 145, 149 (1986). Currently, the program has
been limited to the screening and diagnostic aspects of the program. Id. However, EPSDT and
AFDC (Aid to Families with Dependent Children) programs should help provide funds
through Medicaid benefits to implement advocacy programs for eligible mentally ill children in
institutions to ensure children receive the services they need. Id. at 149. If an active attorney is
employed, fewer children are committed and those who are committed only stay the necessary
amount of time, thus less money is required for hospitalization. Note, supra note 1, at 1285.
Also, school boards may be required to provide protections to ensure that an adequate
education is being provided to institutionalized children. The Supreme Court in Irving Indep.
School Dist. v. Tatro, 466 U.S. 923 (1984), held that The Handicapped Children Act's "re-
lated services" provision included all supportive services needed by a handicapped child (SED
children included). The NMHA believes that in order to ensure that education is properly
achieved, advocacy services are needed to represent the needs of children and their families.
See Meeting Report, supra note 206, at 9, 11.
224. See supra note 165 and accompanying text.
225. The unavailability of funds, staff, or facilities does not justify default in implement-
ing suitable treatment. Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 373, 377 (M.D. Ala. 1972). As to a
child's right to a publicly supported education, lack of funding is inexcusable. Mills v. Board of
Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866, 881 (D.D.C. 1972) (also stating that a child has a right to counsel at
hearings). See Simet, supra note 205, at 147 (stating that "[n]othing in the due process clause
suggests, for example, that if it is inconvenient or costly for the state to protect individual
rights, then the state may dispense with such protection in order to more efficiently deprive
citizens of their rights.").
226. See Mills, 348 F. Supp. at 876 (stating that if there are not enough funds, then the
money should be equally distributed so as not to exclude or bear more heavily upon the "ex-
ceptional child."). But see Fialkowski v. Shapp, 405 F. Supp. 946, 958 (E.D. Pa. 1975) (stat-
ing that equal educational opportunities are not measurable in terms of equal financial
expenditures).
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vulnerable ages. 127 Preventative measures are most essential and effective
when they are taken in the earliest years of life-the most critical stages of
development, which, if neglected, may result in irreversible damage.228 If a
child is unnecessarily stigmatized, institutionalized, denied adequate educa-
tion, or treated improperly, the child's physical and mental health is
threatened.229 These setbacks may then cause future hospitalization, crimi-
nal conduct, and academic failure.2 30 In the end, the government will very
likely expend far more money on the individual than if the preventative
measures would have been taken initially.231
Child advocacy services through the P&A Act are crucial in ensuring
that a child's interests and rights are protected. Funding must be a priority
in government programs because any of the expenditures made are a wise
and essential investment in a child's future. According to a report by the
Joint Commission on the Mental Health of Children regarding advocacy
services to mentally ill children:
The program we recommend is not a cheap one, nor would any
program be that is commensurate with the need. But if we
choose now not to meet the cost, we shall eventually pay a far
higher price, reckoned not only in economic loss, but in human
misery. We cannot refuse to mount the effort. If we are true to
our heritage, we must recognize that we are confronted not
merely with the needs of children, but with their inalienable
rights. 2
227. One of the goals of the National Mental Health Association and the Special Edu-
cation Coalition for the SED children is that a federal priority be established and federal
resources committed to ensure appropriate education as well as other related services for SED
children for prevention and early intervention programs. National Mental Health Association,
Meeting the Needs of Children With Serious Emotional Disturbances Through Education for
Handicapped Children Act (PL 94-142): Recommended Goals for Action 4 (Dec. 1987). "Our
children's mental and emotional health is deserving of our highest priority." Position Paper,
supra note 16, at 4.
228. See CRISIS IN CHILD MENTAL HEALTH: CHALLENGE FOR THE 70's, REPORT OF THE
JOINT COMMISSION ON MENTAL HEALTH OF CHILDREN 2 (1970) (CHILD MENTAL HEALTH).
229. Id.
230. Failure to provide proper resources to a child with mental disorders will result in a
generation unable to "make it" and increased numbers destined for juvenile court, reformato-
ries, jails, welfare institutions, and the back wards of state mental hospitals. Id. at 12.
231. Vast expenditures, both human and monetary, must be made in order to assist
children when they need services, because in the long run the costs will multiply in terms of
mental illness and human malfunctioning, both of which lead to underproductivity. See id. at
1-3, 8, 12. "We believe it is in the interest of the economy to concentrate resources on the new
generation and thus eliminate problems that later exact a high price." Id. at 14.
232. Id.
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VIII. CONCLUSION
Since the institutionalized child has liberty interests at stake both
before and after being placed in an institution, due process is required
throughout the child's confinement by the fourteenth amendment of the
United States Constitution. The existing remedies protecting the institu-
tionalized child's interests are inadequate; thus, increased procedures are
necessary to avoid the deprivation of the child's needs and constitutional
rights. Therefore, the institutionalized child should be provided with a right
to counsel, which would best be implemented through P&A programs
under the P&A Act.
By establishing and requiring an amendment explicitly including chil-
dren, with clear guidelines in the P&A Act for the protection and advocacy
services to children, the NIMH would ensure that the funding and techni-
cal assistance they give to state P&A systems are also extended to institu-
tionalized children. Thus, the due process requirements to protect the lib-
erty interests of the confined mentally ill children would be met.
Furthermore, the government would be advancing its interests in the reha-
bilitation of mentally ill youth and possibly in the prevention of future hos-
pitalization and criminal activity. The P&A program for institutionalized
children would not be merely another program dealing with the recurring
symptoms of social disorder. Instead, the protection and advocacy of institu-
tionalized children would prevent many scars, thereby cutting at the roots
that grow into a multitude of social problems.
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